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DON’T JUST MAKE REDISTRICTERS
MORE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE
PEOPLE, MAKE THEM THE PEOPLE
STEVEN F. HUEFNER*

I. INTRODUCTION
The title of this panel, “Is There a Way to Design an Apolitical
Redistricting Process?,” invites a focus on the question of possibility.
Of course, a threshold and related question is the desirability of
having an apolitical redistricting process. Indeed, a rich and expanding
literature exists about whether or not “independent” redistricting is
1
desirable. This essay, however, will offer some thoughts primarily
about the practical possibility of designing an apolitical redistricting
process, intertwined as that question may be with the question of its
desirability.
At the outset it is important to define what “apolitical”
redistricting means, because in common usage it can signify at least
two quite different things in this context: (1) redistricting that is not
allowed to intentionally promote the broader partisan political
interests of those controlling the redistricting; or (2) redistricting done
without any awareness of or concern for the partisan political balance
2
of the electorate of the resulting districts. The first meaning entails a

* Professor of Law and Senior Fellow of Election Law @ Moritz, The Ohio State
University Michael E. Moritz College of Law. The author is grateful for the advice and
contributions of Terri Enns, Edward Foley, Justin Levitt, and Daniel Tokaji, and for the
research assistance of Alex Sanchez.
1. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV.
593, 600–01 (2002); JUSTIN LEVITT, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
REDISTRICTING 20–22 (2008) (July 1, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/
a_citizens_guide_to_redistricting/; Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses:
The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV.
649, 650 (2002).
2. It also could take on a third, much broader meaning, describing a redistricting process
that makes no substantive or policy choices at all. But this essay tracks a common and somewhat
narrower parlance in which the term is used to connote independence from self-interested
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sense of neutrality and partisan fairness, in which control over the
redistricting process is not awarded as a political spoil to a dominant
party. The second meaning in essence involves redistricting done
blindly, indifferent to its impact on party strength.
Almost by definition, the second type of apolitical redistricting,
done without awareness of partisan demographics, would seem to be
a subset of the first type of apolitical redistricting, done not
deliberately to favor partisan interests. But other variants of the first
type of apolitical redistricting might well take into account in some
fair way the partisan composition of the resulting districts. Given the
3
tendency of Democratic voters to concentrate in urban areas, any
politically “blind” redistricting process that draws districts using some
traditional redistricting criteria such as compactness in fact may
produce a set of district maps that is not politically “fair” (depending,
4
of course, on what “fair” means).
This essay explores possibilities for the first type of apolitical, or
politically independent, redistricting. In doing so it will also note that
the second type of apolitical, or politically blind, redistricting, though
facially attractive to some reformers, is more likely to both generate
opposition and prove ineffective. In focusing on the prospects for
apolitical or independent redistricting, this essay addresses the
substance (or the criteria) and the procedure (or the institution) of an
apolitical redistricting system. It also addresses the primary
implementation challenges associated with bringing to fruition
hypothetical models for an independent redistricting system. This
5
“here to there” discussion draws lessons from recent ballot measure
reform efforts in both California and Ohio, now that prospects for a
judicial approach to taking self-interested partisanship out of
6
redistricting seem increasingly remote.

politicians.
3. See Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line Drawing: Deriving and Measuring Fairness
in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L. J. 1547, 1575 (2005) (noting general correlation between urban
communities and Democratic Party).
4. Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Tobler’s Law, Urbanization, and Electoral Bias: Why
Compact, Contiguous Districts are Bad for the Democrats (Nov. 4, 2009) (unpublished working
paper), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~jowei/identified.pdf; Daniel H. Lowenstein &
Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest For Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or
Illusory?, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (1985).
5. Heather Gerken, Getting From Here to There in Election Reform, 34 OK. C. U. L. REV.
33, 33 (2009).
6. Not everyone has given up this fight, even after Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004),
and League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
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The central claim of the essay, running throughout its separate
discussions of the criteria, processes, and prospects for apolitical
redistricting, is that the electorate as a whole must feel and possess
more of an ownership interest in the redistricting system. Indeed,
recent proposals for redistricting reform have typically foundered
because opponents have successfully argued that an independent
redistricting body was, by definition, not accountable to the public.
This argument needs to be turned on its head.
Part II of this essay summarizes the recent case studies of
California and Ohio. In Part III, this essay discusses substantive
criteria potentially appropriate for independent redistricting, followed
in Part IV by the most promising institutional processes for
independent redistricting. Part V then discusses the practical
challenges of reshaping how most states conduct legislative
redistricting, in light of the historical difficulties reformers have had in
promoting politically independent redistricting, both in court and
through popular initiative and legislative reforms.
II. TWO CASE STUDIES: RECENT REDISTRICTING REFORM EFFORTS
IN CALIFORNIA AND OHIO
California and Ohio offer vivid case studies of the struggle
between politicians, good government groups, and voters over efforts
to create a redistricting process not dominated by partisan politics. In
two high-profile campaigns in 2005, both states saw their voters reject
similar redistricting reform proposals, and both states thereafter have
explored alternative proposals aggressively. But while in 2008
California voters narrowly approved a reform measure calling for the
7
creation of a fourteen-member citizen redistricting commission, so
far Ohio has remained unable to reform its redistricting process,
8
despite repeated additional attempts. In 2006, Democrats in the
minority in the Ohio legislature balked at a Republican offer to put
before the voters a proposal for an independent redistricting
9
commission. In 2009, leaders of both parties offered competing

7. The reform measure was on the statewide ballot as Proposition 11. It was enacted with
about 51% of the vote. California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, Statement of Vote:
November 4, 2008, General Election, Dec. 13, 2008, at 65, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf. Proposition 11 amended Article 21 of the
California Constitution to create the fourteen-member redistricting commission.
8. See infra notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
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10

proposals, but could not find a common approach. Versions of these
proposals remain under consideration in early 2010, but the window
of opportunity is quickly closing. It therefore is worth thinking about
whether differences in the details or presentations of the California
and Ohio proposals may have affected their varying receptions.
A. California
In California, as in most states, state legislators traditionally have
been responsible for drawing legislative and congressional districts.
Since the 1960s, California Democrats effectively have held power
11
over the redistricting process. Between 1982 and 1990, Republicans
thrice failed in efforts to place redistricting in the hands of a
12
bipartisan commission. Then, in a bit of a shift, the legislative
redistricting following the 2000 census involved a bipartisan effort to
13
entrench both incumbent Democrats and incumbent Republicans.
Arguably as evidence of its success, of the 153 congressional and state
legislative races occurring in November 2004, not a single incumbent
14
was defeated and not a single seat changed parties.
Against this backdrop, in 2005 California voters considered a
15
redistricting reform proposal known as Proposition 77.
This
Proposition would have created a redistricting commission composed
of three retired California state or federal judges, and would have
required immediate redistricting in time for the 2006 elections
according to specified criteria, including a prohibition against
16
considering political demographics. Proponents of Proposition 77,

10. See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
11. Leroy C. Hardy & Charles P. Sohner, Constitutional Challenge and Political Response:
California Reapportionment, 1965, 23 WEST. POL. Q. 733, 733–51 (1970).
12. Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to Establish
Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 360–68 (2007); see also Office for
Strategic Information Services, Redistricting Measures That Have Qualified For Statewide Ballot,
available at http://republican.assembly.ca.gov/flashpoint/RedistrictingMeasures0105.pdf; Jessica
Oliver, California Initiatives in Perspective 1966-2002 (2003) (research paper on file with
Claremont McKenna College), available at http://ccdl.libraries.claremont.edu/cdm4/document.
php?CISOROOT=/ric&CISOPTR=14476&REC=1.
13. See Michael Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of
Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 667, 667 n.1 (2006).
14. John Wildermuth, Some Suspect Governor's Plan to Redraw District Lines, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 2, 2005, at A17, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/
01/02/BAGM6AK1OD1.DTL.
15. Official Voter Information Guide, Text of Proposed Laws (Proposition 77) at 66,
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov05/voter_info_pdf/text77.pdf.
16. Id.
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including Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, argued that the initiative
would create significantly more competitive districts, increase
minority representation, and remove self-interested incumbents from
17
the redistricting process. However, well-financed opponents of
Proposition 77, which included Democrats, Republicans, and minority
18
interest groups alike, argued that the plan was a “power grab,” that
retired judges were not representative of the state’s diversity, and that
the measure left redistricting to a trio of people who were not
19
accountable to the voters. The proposition was soundly defeated,
20
receiving only 40.2% of the vote.
In 2008, good government groups including the League of Women
Voters, Common Cause of California, and AARP took another shot,
crafting a new reform to address directly the flaws of the 2005
proposal and of earlier redistricting initiatives. Under this measure,
dubbed Proposition 11, California would place the power of drawing
state legislative districts in the hands of its voters in the form of a
Citizens Redistricting Commission. The Commission would be
relatively isolated from self-interested politicians and would reflect
21
the diversity of California. The fourteen-member Commission would
be selected through an application process open to anyone who had
been a registered California voter for the previous five years and had
voted in two of the past three statewide elections, subject to meeting
additional qualifications. The role of the Citizens Redistricting

17. Douglas Johnson, Restoring the Competitive Edge: Full Report, Sept. 26, 2005, (report
on file with Claremont McKenna College), available at http://ccdl.libraries.claremont.edu/cdm4/
document.php?CISOROOT=/ric&CISOPTR=2814&REC=2; see also Join Arnold Fact Sheet,
available at http://digital.library.ucla.edu/websites/2005_997_008/www.joinarnold.com/site/
c.itJUJ9MTIuE/b.695343/k.19E6/Proposition_77__The_Voter_Empowerment_Act.htm.
18. See, e.g., Christian Berthelson, Group Backing Remap Initiative Caught Up in
Donations Dispute, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2005, at B3 (then-House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi
asking Democrats to help raise money against Prop. 77); Nancy Vogel & Michael Finnegan,
Stage Set for Fundraising Free-For-All, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2005, at A1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/19/local/me-redistrict19/3 (request by Reps. Howard
Berman, D-Calif., and John Doolittle, R-Calif., to raise soft money to defeat Prop. 77); John
Wildermuth, Debate on Prop. 77 Over Retired Judges, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 2005, at B1 (Senior
Vice President for Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund stating that three
people cannot represent diversity of California).
19. Jill Stewart, Op-Ed, Terminator vs. Gerrymander, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005, at A23,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9902E2D9143EF934A35752C1A
9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
20. California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson, State Ballot Measures: Proposition No.
73–80, Nov. 8, 2005, at 6, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2005_special/detail_
props_formatted_pg1_7.pdf.
21. See CAL. CONST. art 21, §§ 1–3; see also CA GOVT. CODE §§ 8251–8253.6 (2008).
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Commission was to “draw new districts in conformity with strict,
nonpartisan rules designed to create districts of reasonably equal
22
population that will provide fair representation for all Californians.”
Support for Proposition 11 gained momentum when the state
23
legislature failed to enact a budget by the constitutional deadline.
Partisan gridlock in the legislature was blamed for much of the delay
in passing the budget, and supporters of Proposition 11 argued that
the establishment of a redistricting commission independent from the
24
legislature would render legislators more accountable to voters. This
time, despite opposition once again from Democrats, Republicans,
and minority interest groups, Proposition 11 passed by a narrow
25
margin of 1.8% of the total vote. The process of forming the
fourteen-member Citizens Redistricting Commission is now
underway, and as of the February 2010 application deadline, the
California State Auditor had received over 30,000 initial applications
26
for the fourteen positions on the commission.
B. Ohio
While the Ohio legislature retains authority to draw the state’s
congressional districts, since 1967 the redistricting process for both
houses of the state legislature has resided not in the legislature itself
but in the hands of a five-member apportionment board composed of
the Governor, the Secretary of State, the State Auditor, and two
members respectively appointed by the Republican and Democratic
legislative leadership. The political party constituting the
apportionment board majority has reliably seen gains in state

22. Citizens Redistricting Commission, Background of the California Redistricting
Commission: A New Experiment in Direct Democracy, http://www.wedrawthelines.ca.gov/
downloads/backgrounder.pdf.
23. See Matthew Yi, Governor Cuts $510 Million Before Signing Long-Overdue State
Budget, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 24, 2008, at A1 (noting that Governor Schwarzenegger went to a
rally for Proposition 11 after signing the late budget and chastising lawmakers).
24. Steven Harmon, First Ad in Redistricting Battle Promises to “Clean Up Mess” in
Sacramento, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008.
25. The measure affects the redistricting of only the California Senate, Assembly, and
Board of Equalization districts. Responsibility for drawing California’s congressional districts
remains with the state legislature.
26. Citizens Redistricting Commission Statistics, Citizens Redistricting Commission,
https://application.wedrawthelines.ca.gov/statistics (last visited May 5, 2010). However, the
small proportion of women and minority applicants apparently is worrisome to some. See
George Skelton, Reform Takes a Tough Road, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at A2, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/18/local/la-me-cap18-2010jan18.
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legislative seats following each decennial redistricting. In 1981, Ohio
Republicans and the League of Women Voters of Ohio proposed a
ballot measure to create a bipartisan commission that would have
created districts based upon a mathematical formula designed to
28
achieve optimal compactness. Democrats, who then controlled the
apportionment board, opposed the measure, arguing that it would
29
dilute minority representation. The measure failed, receiving only
30
42% of the vote.
By 1990, Republicans controlled a majority of the apportionment
board. By 1994 Republicans had taken control of both the state
House and the state Senate. Another League of Women Voters
reform proposal failed to make it to the ballot in 1999, and
Republicans maintained control of the apportionment board for the
post-2001 census redistricting.
In 2005, a group called Reform Ohio Now (RON) sponsored a
redistricting reform measure known as Issue 4 that sought to remove
31
redistricting from the hands of the apportionment board. The
proposal would have created a bipartisan commission, chosen by state
court judges, responsible for adopting redistricting plans based on a
mathematical formula that most rewarded “competitive” electoral
32
districts. Issue 4 was part of a slate of four constitutional
amendments designed to reform Ohio’s electoral process more
generally, in response to noticeable deficiencies in the 2004 elections
33
and perceived corruption within Ohio government. These ballot
measures were promoted by several left-of-center interest groups,

27. Democrats have not held control of both the Ohio House and Senate since several
legislatures in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Democrats controlled the apportionment
board. See Political Composition of the Ohio General Assembly—1900 to 2006, Gongwer News
Service, Inc., available at http://www.gongwer-oh.com/public/gahis.html.
28. David Shutt, Amendments Put to Ohioans, TOLEDO BLADE, Nov. 1, 1981, at B9,
available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=KHgUAAAAIBAJ&sjid=pQIEAAAAIB
AJ&pg=5540,2617983&dq=ohio+issue-2+1981&hl=en.
29. Id.
30. Ohio Secretary of State, General Election Overview: November 3, 1981, available at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/1980-1989OfficialElectionResults/
GenElectOverview11031981.aspx.
31. Dale A. Oesterle, Ohio’s Dramatic Citizen Initiative: “Reform Ohio Now”, ELECTION
LAW @ MORITZ, Oct. 11, 2005, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/2005/
051011.php.
32. Ohio Ballot Board, Ohio Issues Report, Nov. 8, 2005, at 10–11, available at
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/elections/2005/OIR2005.pdf.
33. See William Hershey, Voters Link Issues with Trust; Dissatisfaction with Politicians Will
Color Tuesday's Election Outcome, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1.
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34

some from out-of-state. Opponents of Issue 4, including Republican
legislative leaders, conducted a high-profile campaign that
convincingly argued that the measure was an out-of-state power grab
that would place redistricting in the hands of unaccountable
bureaucrats, and would still generate horribly disfigured districts, now
35
in the name of promoting competition. The measure failed badly on
36
Election Day 2005, receiving only 30% of the vote.
Since the defeat of Issue 4, various state legislators have
introduced at least ten joint resolutions in the Ohio legislature in an
37
attempt to get other redistricting reform proposals before the voters.
Of particular note, in 2006, Ohio House Speaker Jon Husted and
Representative Kevin DeWine, former Republican opponents of
Issue 4, led a bipartisan reform effort with some supporters of the
38
RON movement. Their proposal would have created a sevenmember redistricting commission composed of four members
appointed by the legislative leaders of both major parties, and three
39
others chosen by the four appointed members. The proposal allowed
members of the public to submit redistricting plans to the commission
for consideration. Each plan was required to protect existing political
subdivisions as much as possible, and within that constraint, to
maximize competitive districts.
However, in the wake of scandals that shook the Ohio Republican
Party in 2006, legislative Democrats opposed redistricting reform,
even voting against the same measure they had proposed a year
40
earlier and opting to take their chances on capturing an

34. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 375.
35. See id. at 376.
36. Ohio Secretary of State, 2005 Election Results: General Election—November 8, 2005,
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/2005ElectionsResults/051108Issue4.a
spx.
37. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 5, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009–10); S.J. Res. 4, 128th Gen. Assem.
(Ohio 2009–10); H.J. Res. 15, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009–10); S.J. Res. 6, 127th Gen.
Assem. (Ohio 2007–08); H.J. Res. 4, 127th Gen. Assembly (Ohio 2007–08); H.J. Res. 1, 127th
Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2007–08); S.J. Res. 5, 126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005–06); H.J. Res. 13,
126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005–06); H.J. Res. 9, 126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005–06); H.J. Res. 6,
126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005–06).
38. William Hershey, Legislative Districts May Be Fall Ballot Issue; Kevin DeWine
Introducing Measure to Allow Ohio Voters to Change How Redistricting Is Done, DAYTON
DAILY NEWS, May 5, 2006, at A6.
39. H.J. Res. 13 (Ohio 2005-06).
40. Jim Siegel, Redistricting Plans Rejected; Democrats Vote Down GOP Plan, Then Their
Own, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 26, 2006, at 1D.
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apportionment board majority in November 2006 (which they did).
They anticipated that the party that captured the three open
apportionment board seats in the 2006 election would, four years
later, reelect these same statewide office holders as incumbents, and
42
thus retain control of the board for the 2011 redistricting cycle.
In both 2007 and 2008, legislative Republicans again introduced
joint resolutions to reform Ohio’s redistricting process, with various
combinations of a bipartisan board or substantive constraints on map
43
drawing, to no effect. In 2009, the Republican-controlled Ohio
Senate passed a joint resolution proposing to amend the state
constitution to establish an augmented apportionment board,
consisting of four legislative branch members instead of two. The
amendment would have required the board to select, by a
supermajority voting rule, a redistricting plan that promoted district
compactness by protecting existing political subdivisions, and then to
44
maximize competitiveness where possible. Meanwhile, in the now
Democrat-controlled Ohio House, a joint resolution is pending that
would force the existing apportionment board to choose from among
plans submitted by Ohio residents the one that conforms most closely
45
with a predetermined partisan index number. Ohio Democrats, who
once felt confident about retaining control of the apportionment
board after the 2010 election, today see their prospects as much
cloudier, leaving both parties potentially more willing to take the riskaverse route of supporting a redistricting reform ballot measure in the
November 2010 elections.
III. SUBSTANTIVE REDISTRICTING CRITERIA AND CONSTRAINTS
Many of the recent Ohio proposals described above have offered
to reform redistricting not by restructuring the state apportionment
board, but by imposing additional constraints on the plans that the
board (or, in the case of congressional districts, the state legislature)
may consider. The fact that these proposals have not attracted much

41. Joe Hallett, Democrats Might Not Be Up to Doing the Right Thing on Redistricting,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 14, 2006, at 5B.
42. See id.; Jonathan Riskind, OHIO’S GOP-dominated Congressional Delegation Faces a
New Tide, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 21, 2007, at 5G.
43. S.J. Res. 6, 127th Ohio Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2007–08); H.J. Res. 4, 127th Gen. Assem.
(Ohio 2007–08); H.J. Res. 1, 127th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2007–08).
44. Sub. S.J. Res. 5, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009–10).
45. H.J. Res. 15, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009–10).
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bipartisan support may say more about the need to couple criteria
reform with process reform than about whether efforts to specify
stronger redistricting criteria are themselves misguided. In addition,
there is little uniform agreement on what balance of redistricting
criteria is most appropriate, beyond the truism that federal law
requires districts with equal population drawn in compliance with the
Voting Rights Act, and an overwhelming (though not universally
codified) preference for contiguous districts. This Part briefly
identifies the key redistricting criteria, and concludes by suggesting
that a flexible, participatory approach to choosing among these
options may be appropriate.
A. Consideration of Party Affiliation or Support
46

As the film Gerrymandering points out, redistricting has
transformed dramatically over the years largely because of the everincreasing sophistication of mapping tools and the use of exceedingly
precise demographic data.
When political partisans control
redistricting, it can be, and generally is, manipulated to self-interested
ends. One reform therefore would be to prohibit the use of party
registration data and precinct voting records in the drawing of district
boundaries. This is the “blind” version of apolitical redistricting
identified in the Introduction.
47
This type of constraint, though supported in some quarters, has
two main problems. The first is that other data can readily, if
somewhat erratically, be used as a proxy for party affiliation. When
partisan redistricting commissions or legislatures draw maps, the
mapmakers are sure to be aware of where their supporters and
opponents are strongest, even without looking at precise voting
patterns. By looking instead at neighborhood socio-economic levels
or racial composition—which Voting Rights Act compliance may even
mandate considering—districts may still be drawn with a deliberate
48
partisan effect. Admittedly, mapmakers will be taking greater risks in
attempting to predict the partisan composition of districts without
46. GERRYMANDERING (Green Film Company 2010).
47. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 600–01; Illinois Reform Commission, 100 Day
Report, at 56–57 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.reformillinoisnow.org/press%20releases/
IRC%20100-Day%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf; Proposition 77, (2)(i), available at http://www.
sos.ca.gov/elections/bp_nov05/voter_info_pdf/text77.pdf.
48. In fact, in some jurisdictions the Voting Rights Act may even require the direct
consideration of partisan electoral data, in order to determine whether minority-voting patterns
are polarized and whether a remedial district is effective.

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

6/2/2010 12:44:45 PM

MAKING REDISTRICTERS THE PEOPLE

47

access to detailed party affiliation data, and that heightened risk could
dampen the enthusiasm for partisan excess in the process. But there
are more effective ways of constraining the partisan excesses than to
redirect mapmakers into using secondary data to accomplish partisan
gerrymanders.
This is especially true in light of the second problem of blind
redistricting, which is that it may be in fact less fair. This is most
obviously true if blind redistricting occurs according to other criteria
that favor compact districts or protect existing political subdivisions
and other communities of interest. According to prevailing
demographic trends of the early twenty-first century, this type of
redistricting may more often naturally pack heavily Democratic urban
voters into fewer districts overall, while dispersing a majority of
Republicans more evenly throughout a greater number of suburban
49
and rural districts. Accordingly, as next discussed, relying on party
affiliation data may be required in order to achieve some versions of
fairness in drawing district maps. An independent redistricting scheme
therefore need not prohibit the use of data concerning citizens’ party
affiliation, but should instead look for other ways to control the use of
this data for self-interested partisan manipulation.
B. Partisan Fairness
Juxtaposed against the notion of partisan manipulation might be
the ideal of partisan fairness. In a plurality-based electoral system,
partisan fairness does not mean that the proportion of legislative seats
won by a specific political party must match the proportion of total
votes cast for legislative candidates who are members of that party.
Instead, partisan fairness can be thought of in terms of whether a
change in vote share of a specific amount in either direction would
produce a symmetrical, rather than proportional, change in seats won
50
by either party. For instance, if a 1% increase in vote share for party
A would result in party A capturing 5% more legislative seats, then a
1% increase in vote share for party B should result in party B
capturing 5% more seats. This type of system is not proportional,

49. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Reapportionment and Party
Alignment in the American States, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 433, 436–37 (2004); Lowenstein &
Steinberg, supra note 4, at 23–24 (noting malapportionment across regions largely benefitted
political party of rural areas).
50. Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for
Partisan Gerrymandering After LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELEC. L.J. 2, 8–9 (2006).
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because a given change in vote share may legitimately generate a
disproportionate seat bonus, but nonetheless the system is fair as long
as corresponding changes affect parties symmetrically.
Among political scientists, symmetry is widely accepted as the best
51
measure of fairness. It can be easily incorporated into a redistricting
framework, and fairness, as thus conceptualized, could serve as an
objective tool for measuring or evaluating the absence of partisan bias
in a redistricting scheme. Indeed, symmetry may be worthy of primary
attention as a redistricting criterion, certainly as much as the typical
three “C’”s” of redistricting reform—competitiveness, compactness,
and communities of interest—to which we now turn.
C. Competitiveness
Competitiveness has been a driving force behind many recent
redistricting reform efforts, and was the centerpiece of the rejected
2005 Ohio proposal. Although a variety of methods for measuring
competitiveness exist, the general approach is to look district-bydistrict at the closeness of the margin of victory of the top statewide
race in the average of several recent elections. The more districts in
which this margin is close, however “close” is defined, the more
competitive the overall map.
The primary argument for using competitiveness as a redistricting
touchstone is that competitive elections will enhance electoral
accountability and produce representatives more in step with the
median voter. If this premise is accepted, then it is natural to prefer
district maps that produce a greater number of competitive elections.
If competitiveness is to be used as a redistricting criterion, several
choices will need to be made concerning which elections to use for the
baseline calculation of victory margin, what victory margin to deem
competitive, and whether to penalize a redistricting scheme that
includes highly noncompetitive, or even simply noncompetitive,
districts.
More recently, however, competitiveness has lost some of its
luster. Although it still maintains a strong following in the reform

51. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 465–66
(2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the symmetry
standard “is widely accepted by scholars as providing a measure of partisan fairness in electoral
systems”); Grofman & King, supra note 50, at 9 (“Most scholars therefore regard electoral
systems with higher levels of electoral responsiveness as better.”);
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community, it has come under criticism both with respect to the
validity of the premise that it enhances electoral accountability, and
because one of its results may be to maximize the number of voters
52
disaffected because their candidate loses. Justin Buchler is among
those making careful arguments against competitiveness along these
53
lines. Prioritizing competitiveness may also require its own version
of distorted map drawing, as opponents of Ohio’s 2005 reform
proposal effectively argued, because voters tend to reside in non54
competitive patterns.
Nonetheless, competitiveness may still deserve a place at the
redistricting table. Arguments for it can be made for reasons
independent of electoral accountability, including the impact of
competitive elections on the quality of campaign debate, and the
resultant shaping of public understanding and preferences on matters
of public policy. Competitive districts also may affect the prospects for
attracting and grooming quality candidates. Moreover, using
competitiveness as a redistricting factor may temper the redistricting
body’s ability to selectively disadvantage one party’s incumbents or
candidates. But as a general rule, it is difficult to identify how much
value to place on the overall competitiveness of a redistricting
scheme. It therefore may be important to place greater emphasis on
partisan fairness, discussed above, while also providing ways, discussed
below, for the voters themselves to retain some flexibility in deciding
whether to seek greater competitiveness.
D. Compactness
Compactness, whether measured by comparing the area of a
district with its perimeter, the ratio of district length to width, or in
several other possible ways (or merely eyeballed rather than
measured), is attractive as a redistricting criterion for both symbolic
and practical reasons. Symbolically, non-compactness is almost a
synonym for gerrymandering, and the bizarre configuration of many
districts is often taken as evidence of partisan distortion. Indeed,

52. See Justin Buchler, Competition, Representation and Redistricting: The Case Against
Competitive Congressional Districts, 17 J. THEORETICAL POLITICS 431 (2005); see also THOMAS
L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE
BAD FOR AMERICA (2008).
53. E.g., Justin Buchler, The Inevitability of Gerrymandering: Winners and Losers Under
Alternative Approaches to Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 17 (2010).
54. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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without compactness, the requirement of district contiguity has
become almost a caricature, and may not be worth having at all when
not supported by some additional sensibility like compactness.
Requiring compact districts therefore constrains mapmakers from too
much manipulation. Yet distorted shapes may serve unbiased or
neutral ends, too, such as keeping the overall map fairer or
ameliorating some of the bias that may result from protecting
communities of interest.
Nevertheless, there are practical reasons to prefer compact
districts. Compact districts may enhance representation because
representatives and candidates can more easily know and traverse
their district. A compact district also may promote the development
of a new community of interest—consisting of the district itself—to
the extent that the compactness facilitates a sense of shared
community among its residents.
E. Communities of Interest and Political Subdivisions
There is widespread agreement that, all other things being equal, a
redistricting plan should not split into separate districts voters who
are part of some pre-existing political subdivision or other community
of interest. But, because all other things are not equal, the difficulty is
in determining for what purposes the splitting of such communities is
permissible. In many locales, voters tend to reside near those who are
politically like-minded, so preserving communities of interest, like
preferring compact districts, may have the direct result of reducing
the overall competitiveness of a redistricting plan. Yet, valorizing
competitiveness may be particularly misguided when it would
disaggregate voters whose natural residential patterns have given rise
to strong geographic political preferences. It is hard to say definitively
when existing communities of interest should and should not remain
sacrosanct, but easy to say that the concern merits attention in the
redistricting process.
F. Flexibility and Accountability in Prioritizing Among Possible
Criteria
The preceding reflections on potential criteria for constraining a
redistricting process demonstrate the complexity of establishing a
specific framework. Indeed, there is little agreement on what are truly
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55

neutral and fair redistricting principles. Although many different
56
models have been proposed, it is difficult to know ahead of time, and
for the circumstances of a particular state, how best to weight and
aggregate potential criteria such as partisan fairness, competitiveness,
compactness, and communities of interest. Furthermore, because
different citizens and interest groups may prioritize these criteria
differently, some trade-offs or compromises may be required.
That is not to say that settling on a best set of neutral redistricting
criteria for a particular state will be problematic, only that it will take
additional work in each state. But one easily made generalization is
that the process by which a state seeks to specify its criteria can make
a huge difference to the acceptability of these citeria. When
redistricting criteria are presented prepackaged by a particular reform
community, they can be easy targets for opponents to attack, given
that, as noted above, most potential criteria have some vulnerabilities
to be exploited. Accordingly, in many reform efforts, proposed
constraints have been rejected as “elite” meddling.
An alternative approach would be to give the public more of a
role in the specification of redistricting criteria than a simple up-ordown vote on a ballot measure (or than a legislative fait accompli in
states without the initiative process). This becomes a meta-level point
about how to implement an apolitical redistricting system, discussed
further in Part V. In addition, the lack of clear agreement on the right
set of redistricting criteria also suggests that efforts to achieve
apolitical redistricting through criteria reform alone may be
insufficient, and that institutional and process reform therefore may
be an essential element.
IV. REDISTRICTING PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS
Typical redistricting reform efforts have proposed establishing
independent commissions to draw legislative maps, in place of the
55. See Fromer, supra note 3, at 1550 (describing the question of what constitutes a fair
redistricting scheme as “bedeviling and pressing”).
56. See, e.g., Sam Hirsch, A Proposal for Redistricting Reform: A Model State
Constitutional Amendment, delivered at the American Mathematical Society’s Special Session
on
the
Redistricting
Problem
(Jan.
8,
2009),
available
at
http://www.americansforredistrictingreform.org/html/documents/HirschRedistrictingPaperforA
merMathSociety.pdf.; Building a National Redistricting Reform Movement, Report of the April
2006 Redistricting Conference hosted by the Campaign Legal Center, League of Women
Voters,
and
The
Council
for
Excellence
in
Government,
available
at
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/1641.pdf.
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state legislatures that historically have been responsible for
redistricting. Although today close to half of the states already assign
an entity other than the legislature some role in the redistricting
57
process, in most of these cases either the non-legislative institution is
itself partisan in design, as with Ohio’s apportionment board, or the
legislature retains substantial partisan control and influence over the
58
process, as with New York’s advisory redistricting commission.
Notable exceptions include Arizona, which established an
independent redistricting commission in 2000, and Iowa, where,
although the legislature retains final authority, a nonpartisan staff
agency, the Legislative Service Bureau, has produced the maps in each
59
of the past three decennial redistricting cycles.
Some reform proposals that seek only to constrain an existing
60
redistricting institution through criteria reform have encountered
skepticism because they would leave the institution’s partisan
61
structure intact. In part this skepticism may result from lack of
agreement about what are truly neutral redistricting principles, which
may heighten concerns that it is unrealistic to expect to constrain an
inherently biased redistricting body. It may also reflect the difficulty
of drafting redistricting rules so tightly as to eliminate all room for
human judgment, because of concerns about unintended

57. JUSTIN LEVITT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 20–22 (2008).
58. N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 83-m.
59. ARIZ. CONST. art. 8, §§ 1–5 (Arizona Redistricting Commission); IOWA CODE §§ 42.1–
42.6 (2009).
60. For example, the Indiana State legislature currently redraws the state’s districts subject
only to the requirement that districts be contiguous. The Indiana State Senate recently
approved a redistricting reform bill, Indiana Senate Bill 80, that would require the state
legislature to follow additional criteria including compactness, preserving communities of
interest, protecting minority rights, and respecting county boundaries. S.B. 80, 116th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2010); see also Community Comment: Redistricting Deserves Independent Look,
EVANSVILLE COURIER & PRESS, Feb. 21, 2010, available at http://www.courierpress.com/news/
2010/feb/21/redistricting-deserves-independent-look/ (containing joint statement by AARP
Indiana, Common Cause/Indiana, and the League of Women Voters of Indiana criticizing S.B.
80 for failing to prohibit the use of partisan political data). Proposals now under consideration in
Florida, if adopted, would require the legislature to draw districts without any “intent to favor
or
disfavor”
a
political
party.
See
FairDistrictsFlorida.org,
Our
Reforms,
http://www.fairdistrictsflorida.org/our_reforms.php (discussing Amendments 5 and 6 on an
upcoming ballot).
61. See, e.g., Jim Siegel, Ohio House Democrats Have Plan to Redistrict, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Feb. 2, 2010, at 1B (quoting OSU political scientist Richard Gunther to say that
proposed criteria reform alone is “inadequate” to prevent worst partisan abuses, and should be
melded with institutional reform); cf. Fromer, supra note 3, at 1570–86 (discussing
vulnerabilities of various redistricting criteria); Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 644–45 (describing
inherent conflict of interest in letting legislators conduct redistricting).
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consequences. In other words, the more that a redistricting institution
is independent of those seeking to represent the districts, the more
room there may be to allow some flexibility in the criteria that
institution must employ. Furthermore, it is always easy to condemn
the outcome of any process perceived to be controlled by a biased
group, particularly given the lack of agreement on what criteria
should constrain the process. Therefore, regardless of the substantive
constraints adopted, independent redistricting may also require
reforming who is in charge of the process, and how that institution
functions.
This Part addresses two key points related to the prospect of
institutional reform of the redistricting process. The first point, which
Michael Kang, Daniel Lowenstein, Heather Gerken, and others have
previously made, is that the redistricting process in fact may need
62
more politics, properly defined, not less. The second point is related.
In redistricting, as in matters of governance generally, citizens
gravitate towards the principle of accountability. This Part seeks to
extend both of these insights toward promoting greater citizen
participation in redistricting institutions, rather than giving the
redistricting task to independent experts or bipartisan commissions.
A. Could Infusing Additional Politics Lead to a More “Apolitical”
Redistricting?
Though sympathetic with the effort to rid the redistricting process
of partisan manipulation, Michael Kang has argued that
[d]elegation of redistricting to apolitical institutions, such as courts
and independent commissions, comes with heavy costs . . . . [It]
ensures that redistricting is far removed from the necessary degree
of public engagement, scrutiny, and accountability . . . . [R]eformers
would eradicate from redistricting the positive values of the
63
political process as well.

He continues: “Redistricting is an inherently political question
64
that ultimately requires political answers.”
In labeling redistricting as “inherently political,” Kang
contemplates a version of the notion described earlier that different
citizens may prioritize possible redistricting criteria differently.
62. See infra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
63. Kang, supra note 13, at 668.
64. Id. at 686.
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Because there is no clear answer about which criteria to favor,
choosing among these possibilities is a political question in the sense
that it requires making a policy choice among contested options. It
need not, however, be a partisan issue.
Of course, one way to handle this political question would be to
propose to the voters a particular algorithm or arrangement of reform
criteria for redistricters to use to draw the maps, and let the voters, or
their representatives, approve that set of criteria. But what Kang has
in mind instead is to let existing redistricting institutions continue to
have primary responsibility for preparing district maps, using
whatever criteria may (or may not) already be in place, and then to
require the resulting maps to be submitted to the voters for
65
approval. This act of direct democracy is what Kang describes as the
66
infusion of additional politics into the redistricting process.
Professor Daniel Lowenstein has followed this suggestion in a
challenge to California’s recent reform. Lowenstein is the primary
sponsor of a constitutional initiative that would repeal Proposition 11,
thereby disbanding the Citizens Redistricting Commission and
returning redistricting responsibility to the state legislature, while also
making the legislature’s adoption of redistricting maps subject to the
67
referendum process (as is also now the case under Proposition 11).
Lowenstein agrees with Kang that redistricting is inherently political,
and argues that “when you try to take a political process and put it in
the hands of bureaucrats who are supposed to be non-partisan, it’s a
68
fraud and it’s not going to work.” The ballot measure, called the
Financial Accountability in Redistricting Act, will be before the voters
in November 2010.
Although many observers view the Financial Accountability in
Redistricting Act as an effort by California Democrats to regain
69
control of the redistricting process, Lowenstein and Kang argue that
65. Id. at 699–713.
66. Id. at 668–70.
67. Financial Accountability in Redistricting Act, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/
2009/090861.aspx.
68. James Koren, Some Democrats Seek to Roll Back Citizen Control of Redistricting,
DAILY BULLETIN, Feb. 17, 2010, available at http://www.dailybulletin.com/ci_14421716. Political
scientist Thomas Brunell, after arguing that increased competitiveness should not be a
redistricting objective, similarly urges that the redistricting task be given to a group of
individuals from a diverse cross-section of the state, popularly elected to perform this duty,
namely, the state legislature. BRUNELL, supra note 52, at 116.
69. Lowenstein himself has indicated that Democratic congressman Howard Berman is
behind the initiative. See Kevin Modesti, New Redistricting Process is Giving Power to the
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the referendum process is sufficient to inject a healthy dose of public
involvement into redistricting. This act of direct democracy, they
suggest, should curb both the inclination and the ability of the
legislative mapmakers to gerrymander to excessive partisan ends.
Although a referendum-based redistricting process would in a sense
be more political, the aspiration is that it would be less manipulated
by partisan elites. The broader public politics of the process thus
should produce a redistricting map that has less of partisan bias, and
in that sense produce an outcome that is more “apolitical.”
B. Citizens Want Their Redistricting Institution to be “Accountable”
A related point is how much citizens crave the principle of
accountability. Regardless of how well voters take advantage of this
principle, they understandably want the ability to hold anyone
involved in the political process accountable. This extends to the
redistricting process, a central component of our political system.
Accordingly, one of the more effective arguments against an
independent redistricting commission often has been that it would
render the redistricters unaccountable to the voters: once they are
appointed, the public loses control over them. For instance, precisely
this argument figured prominently in the campaigns to defeat the
2005 Ohio and California ballot measures.
Although accountability can take various forms, it typically means
the ability to defeat an untrustworthy or incompetent public servant
at the polls. Yet there is an obvious irony (as my law students are
quick to point out) in wanting those who draw the maps to be
accountable to the voters, while at the same time letting them draw
their own maps even in self-interested ways that often deliberately
reduce voters’ abilities to defeat them on Election Day! Furthermore,
in some states, crucial aspects of the redistricting process occur behind
closed doors, leaving voters little opportunity to understand how
particular redistricting choices were made and when to blame their
specific legislator for complicity in a redistricting abuse.
70
In states with the popular referendum, the option to override the
People, DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Feb. 22, 2010, at A1 (“The repeal effort is officially headed by
UCLA law professor Daniel Lowenstein but backed by Democratic members of Congress led
by Rep. Howard Berman, D-Van Nuys.”).
70. Twenty-four states currently provide for a popular referendum. Initiative &
Referendum Institute, What Are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20Fact%20-%20What%20is%20I&R.htm.
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actions of the redistricting institution can provide another type of
accountability. But the extent to which voters can meaningfully
exercise this option is limited if the redistricting processes are
conducted in secret. Although the resulting maps themselves are
public, knowledge of why the districts take the form they do also
would be relevant to a meaningful decision of whether to accept the
map. Accordingly, another aspect of the proposed Financial
Accountability in Redistricting Act would be to require the California
legislature to conduct redistricting in an open fashion, with many
opportunities for public participation.
Yet even when the redistricting process occurs openly, the
shibboleth of electoral “accountability” may be more illusion than
reality. It is an example of what political scientist J.H. Snider has
called “electoral fundamentalism,” the misplaced belief “that
unfettered competition for voter support among candidates for an
71
elected office is adequate to maximize social welfare.” Specifically
with respect to redistricting in which legislators are in charge of the
mapmaking, in Madisonian terms there simply may be no competing
ambition sufficient to counteract the ambition of the mapmakers.
Legislators rarely will pay a price for drawing their districts in selfinterested, rather than public-interested, ways.
Nevertheless, accountability is still what the public wants, even
though it results in rejecting methods of redistricting that likely would
make legislators more accountable. Regardless of how misplaced this
desire for accountability may be in connection with redistricting
reform, it is a reality that needs to be accepted rather than resisted in
seeking to design an independent redistricting process. The next
section therefore considers how to design a redistricting institution
that satisfies the urge for accountability while also promoting partisan
independence.
C. Prospects for Greater Citizen Involvement in Redistricting
Institutions
The most promising approach to ridding much of the partisan
excesses from the redistricting process, while also providing the public

71. J.H. Snider, If Men Were Angels . . . : Should the Checks & Balances System Include
Electoral Reform Juries?, delivered at the 2009 Annual Meeting & Exhibition of the American
Political Science Association (Sept. 3–6, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1451155.
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with a much more meaningful version of accountability than exists
when legislators draw their own lines, would be to substantially
increase direct public participation in the process of creating and
choosing legislative maps. In contrast to the approaches of
Lowenstein and Kang, in which legislatures still would craft the map
but then have to submit it for popular approval, this approach calls
for heavy citizen input in all stages of crafting the map. Furthermore,
as suggested above it also could allow the possibility of similar citizen
input in refining the substantive criteria to be used for comparing and
evaluating potential maps.
Heather Gerken has previously written about the risk that, in the
pursuit of independence from partisan politics, electoral reform
projects, including redistricting reform efforts, can become
72
disconnected with political reality. Political reforms are often elitedriven and can evince an ivory tower quality, which the public may
resent and politicians easily can ridicule. While Gerken’s caution may
apply most forcefully to the issue of how to build sufficient political
and popular support to get a reform measure adopted (the focus of
Part V of this essay), it also has implications for the related issue of
how to design the best redistricting institution. Her suggestion is that
reform efforts seek to “inoculate” themselves against politics, rather
73
than insulate themselves from politics entirely. Just how much
inoculation is ideal, or what weakened virus to put in the vaccine, will
74
depend on the type of reform.
Ohio recently experimented with an approach to redistricting that
provides an interesting variation on the idea of political inoculation.
In April and May of 2009, a group composed of Ohio Secretary of
State Jennifer Brunner, several current and former state legislators,
the League of Women Voters of Ohio, Common Cause, and other
non-partisan advocacy organizations sponsored a redistricting
competition that invited public participation in the map drawing
75
process. The group, called Ohio Redistricting Competition Partners,
held the competition to show that an open process based on objective

72. Heather Gerken, The Double-Edged Sword of Independence: Inoculating Electoral
Reform Commissions Against Everyday Politics, 6 ELECTION L.J. 184, 191 (2007).
73. Id. at 185.
74. Id. at 194.
75. Ohio Secretary of State, Ohio Redistricting Competition, Competition Facts,
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/redistrictInfoComp/redistrictFacts.aspx (last visited Apr. 14,
2010).
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76

criteria can generate fair legislative districts.
Any member of the public was allowed to register and submit a
redistricting plan for Ohio’s congressional districts, using 2000 census
77
data and free software and training provided for the competition. To
qualify for consideration, submissions had to meet three
requirements, in compliance with federal law: contiguous districts,
equal population across districts, and adherence to Voting Rights Act
78
requirements. The competition then scored qualifying plans under a
pre-determined formula relying on four quantifiable factors: (1)
communities of interest (including counties and municipalities); (2)
79
compactness; (3) competitiveness; and (4) representational fairness.
Using this evaluation methodology, the three “winning” plans scored
dramatically higher than the actual 2001 congressional redistricting
plan, and even the worst scoring submission scored substantially
higher than the existing map in terms of the greater number of
competitive districts, the reduced number of fragmented communities
80
of interest, and district compactness.
This example, though conducted as only a hypothetical exercise,
exemplifies another kind of infusion into the redistricting process of
more “politics,” again in the sense of public deliberation about a
significant policy choice. One of the initiative proposals under serious
81
consideration in the 2010 Ohio legislature draws heavily from the
Ohio Redistricting Competition model. Similarly, Micah Altman and
Michael McDonald have collaborated on the development of an open
source mapmaking software tool, which could allow widespread
82
public participation in the design of district maps.
This kind of public politicking has the potential to displace the

76. Id.
77. Much of the training and administration was provided by Mark Salling, see Ohio
Secretary of State, Ohio Redistricting Competition: Software training, http://www.sos.state.oh.
us/SOS/redistrictInfoComp/softwareTraining.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2010), another
contributor to this symposium, see Mark J. Salling, Ohio’s Use of Geographic Information
Systems to Demonstrate Public Participation in the Redistricting Process, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 113 (2010).
78. Id. at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/redistrictInfoComp/redistrictFacts.aspx.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See H.J. Res. 15, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009–10).
82. See generally Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated
Redistricting, 34 J. STATISTICAL SOFTWARE (forthcoming 2010); cf. Micah Altman & Micah
McDonald, The Promise and Perils of Computers in Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 69 (2010).

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

6/2/2010 12:44:45 PM

MAKING REDISTRICTERS THE PEOPLE

59

partisan politicking that has traditionally characterized most
redistricting in the United States. Again, any number of variants on
this idea can be imagined, whether open public competitions, or
83
citizen assemblies, or electoral reform juries.
Furthermore,
depending on local conditions in various states, this type of broadly
participatory approach might occur as an official government process,
as some sort of state-sanctioned decennial citizen assembly, or as a
private sector, self-appointed effort to create a public consensus.
Many other details of a citizen assembly or jury, such as the size,
selection process, and governing rules, or of the structure and
administration of a public competition, would of course also need to
be settled, as would the substantive criteria for the resulting
mapmaking. These details can be especially important to civil rights
groups, which understandably may worry that poorly constituted
citizen assemblies will result in majority interests swamping minority
concerns. The key, therefore, is to structure a meta-level process that
will enable states to foster widespread agreement upon these details
when they adopt their own version of a transparent, citizen-led
(rather than elite-dominated) redistricting institution and
accompanying redistricting criteria.
V. OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION
On its face, the idea of giving redistricting responsibility to a
citizen assembly, or of conducting a public mapmaking competition as
more than just a hypothetical exercise, may seem a hopelessly
unrealistic and ivory tower endeavor. Especially given how little this
essay has spelled out the actual details either of such a process or of
the substantive criteria that should constrain it, the idea
understandably may provoke the response: “How can this possibly
work? What we really need is something like Sam Hirsch’s fully
84
formed model constitutional amendment!” A citizen-directed
reform, however, including one that also entrusts the specification of
many of these details to the citizens, may hold greater promise of

83. See generally Snider, supra note 71 (discussing electoral reform juries); Chris
Elmendorf, Election Commissions & Electoral Reform: An Overview, 5 ELECTORAL L.J. 425
(2006). Elmendorf and Ethan Leib have a joint effort underway to develop a more specific
design of a citizen assembly. Ethan Leib, Leib v. Gerken/Elmendorf on Electoral Reform
Design: 4 Years Later, PROFSBLAWG, July 10, 2009, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2009/07/leib-v-gerkenelmendorf-on-electoral-reform-design-4-years-later.html.
84. See generally Hirsch, supra note 56.
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actual implementation than any other approach.
For starters, a juriscentric approach to redistricting reform under
85
the federal constitution is a clear long shot. Also unlikely to succeed,
given the current partisan gridlock in Congress, are efforts to impose
a federal mandate that states redistrict their congressional seats in a
86
particular way. Nor do calls for a constitutional amendment seem
87
likely to go very far. And despite an effort currently underway in
88
Minnesota, few state legislatures are likely to support legislative
efforts to give away their redistricting authority, at least not until a
bandwagon effect is underway from other states’ reforms. Instead, as
89
in California in 2008 and Arizona in 2000, redistricting reform is
most likely to come through the popular initiative.
Unfortunately, redistricting reform initiatives have usually failed,
often by wide margins. One careful study of all twelve redistricting
reform ballot measures to face the electorate between 1936 and 2008
concluded that the most important variable affecting the success or
failure of such a measure, much more than the specific content of a
reform proposal or any recent history of partisan gerrymandering in
the state, was the strength of the majority party’s opposition to the
90
reform.
The strength (and funding) of the opposition effort may not tell
85. In the wake of Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), some scholars have attempted to
articulate a justiciable standard for identifying unconstitutional gerrymandering, see, e.g.,
Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable Standard
and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 243 (2009);
Grofman & King, supra note 50, at 5 (holding out hope that a Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1954), moment for political gerrymandering will arrive to usher in a judicially triggered
redistricting revolution). To be sure, a juriscentric approach to redistricting reform will not
happen before the 2011 round of redistricting, and it also seems doubtful that it will happen in
the wake of this round. A handful of state constitutions do have as-yet untested provisions that
would prohibit undue favoritism of party or candidate.
86. See David Schultz, Regulating the Political Thicket: Congress the Courts, and State
Reapportionment Commissions, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 107, 140–43 (2008) (proposing that
Congress mandate use of redistricting commissions); see also Fairness and Independence in
Redistricting Act of 2009, S. 1332, 111th Cong. (2009); Fairness and Independence in
Redistricting Act of 2009, H.R. 3025, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to prohibit States from
carrying out more than one congressional redistricting after a decennial census, and to require
States to conduct redistricting through independent commissions).
87. See David Brooks, What’s Next, Mr. President?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.12, 2010, at A31.
88. See H.F. 198, 86th Legis. Sess. (Minn. 2009–2010) (proposing a four-member temporary
redistricting advisory committee selected by the legislative leadership of the State House and
State Senate).
89. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, Proposition 106, available at
http://www.azredistricting.org/?page=prop106 (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
90. Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 380.
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the complete story, however. In the prototypical reform effort, the
majority party’s aggressive opposition campaign also has been able to
capitalize on two distinct vulnerabilities: (1) the relatively low salience
of redistricting reform among the general public and (2) public
skepticism towards elite and unaccountable commissions. Both of
these vulnerabilities could be neutralized, or at least meaningfully
reduced, with a substantially more participatory reform process
focusing on citizen control rather than independent commissions.
A. Overcoming Low Salience
Professors Joshua Fougere, Stephen Ansolabehere, and Nathaniel
Persily recently completed an empirical study of voters’ attitudes
91
towards redistricting reform. They concluded that “one of the
primary takeaways from our study is that Americans are not wellinformed or strongly opinionated when it comes to drawing election
92
districts.” Even recent reform organization polling, after priming
respondents about their level of distrust of government, finds that
respondents rank redistricting reform below most other reform
93
proposals in terms of how much impact it would have. This suggests
an obvious disconnect between the general public, on the one hand,
and the advocacy and reform communities, on the other, who in
contrast to the general public are greatly exercised about redistricting
reform, perhaps seeing it as more important than campaign finance
94
reform.
It says almost nothing to suggest that the best way to overcome
public apathy is to convert disinterest into interest. But in the
redistricting context, what this conversion requires is something other
than just a typical information campaign intended to capture public
attention and sway public opinion to get voters to support a reform

91. Joshua Fougere, Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Partisanship, Public
Opinion and Redistricting (January 2010) (manuscript on file with Duke Journal of
Constitutional Law & Public Policy).
92. Id. at 33. Their study included a Pew Research Center survey in which a majority of
respondents knew nothing about the redistricting issue. Id. at 6 (citing Press Release, Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press, Most Have Heard Little or Nothing About
Redistricting Debate: Lack of Competition in Elections Fails to Stir Public (Oct. 27, 2006),
available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/294.pdf).
93. See Midwest Democracy Network, Midwestern Attitudes on Political Reform, June
2008, http://midwestdemocracynetwork.org/files/pdf/Five_State_2008_PollReport.pdf.
94. See Danny Yadron, Heart of Reform is in Drawing Political Maps, Not Finance, Some
Say, MEDILL REPORTS - CHICAGO, Oct. 14, 2009, available at news.medill.northwestern.edu/
chicago/news.aspx?id=142273 (discussing public response to redistricting in Springfield, Ill.).

DO NOT DELETE

62

6/2/2010 12:44:45 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 5:37

measure on Election Day. Instead, the development of public concern
about redistricting should occur through a grass-roots mobilization
that, long before an initiative measure is on the ballot, invites voters
to consider how redistricting ideally should occur, and to play an
active part in developing that process. Even if it involves only a tiny
sample of the general public, as for instance with a citizen jury or
assembly, the opportunity for public participation in the design, rather
than just the approval, of a redistricting institution could substantially
increase the salience of the issue to the public at large. This early
public engagement then could help to energize and inform other
citizens as a subsequent initiative campaign unfolds.
Something like the Ohio Redistricting Competition, or the similar
open source mapmaking software project that Micah Altman and
95
others have been developing for application nationwide, could offer
one option to meaningfully increase public participation in the
redistricting process. Open source mapmaking could prove especially
useful if public participation is encouraged and fostered in the design
of the competition and the choice of substantive criteria by which
proposed maps are judged. Another variant of a more participatory
redistricting reform project is outlined below, this one involving a
citizen-based mediation among interested stakeholders at the design
stage of the reform process. But first one additional note is in order,
about the ripeness of this moment for a grassroots, high-salience
rethinking of the redistricting process.
Today there is no shortage of public cynicism and distrust about
government generally. Even if very little of this cynicism currently is
directed specifically at the redistricting process, it is there to be
harnessed by the right confluence of mobilizing strategies. The past
two decades have witnessed a continuing battle over the structure of
the American political system, involving such issues as legislative term
limits, lobbying reform, campaign finance regulation, and matters of
election administration. In all cases, even though at stake are
fundamental issues about representative government and distortions
thereto, the public has primarily been involved only by either voting
up or down on a state ballot measure, or spectating as reform
proposals move through self-interested state legislatures and
Congress. Redistricting reform now offers the public an opportunity
to take a different and much more active role in leading this

95. Altman & McDonald, supra note 82.
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continuing battle over the essence of representative democracy.
B. Overcoming Public Skepticism: California and Ohio Revisited
Although currently apathetic about redistricting reform generally,
the public has a much stronger position on accountability. Opponents
of redistricting reform therefore have had an easy target when the
centerpiece of a reform proposal has been an independent
commission. As previously described, a majority party’s well-funded
opposition campaign can easily exploit this public skepticism about
elite institutional solutions.
Here, then, the challenge is to structure a reform that removes the
partisan gamesmanship from redistricting yet still satisfies the voters’
demand for accountability. But accountability does not have to
require a partisan institution with members subject to electoral
control. Instead, a reform measure can offer the public a form of
direct accountability, by putting voters, rather than perceived elites, in
charge. A redistricting reform process structured to serve this end
could substantially undercut opponents’ abilities to poison public
support for it by labeling it unaccountable.
In significant part, this may help explain the success of California’s
2008 initiative, and the failure of the 2005 efforts in both California
and Ohio. As previously observed, in both states the 2005 opposition
campaigns drove stakes through the reform efforts with heavy
advertising campaigns warning against transferring redistricting
96
authority to unaccountable panels of experts. Moreover, public fears
of unaccountable institutions are only heightened when the coalition
proposing the reform is not sufficiently broad-based, as was certainly
true in 2005 of both Reform Ohio Now and Proposition 77. Each of
these coalitions lacked minority support and, consequently, faced
opposition from a variety of groups and organizations.
In 2008, in contrast, Proposition 11 called for the creation of a
citizens’ commission, consisting of fourteen members selected
through an application process open to California voters generally.
While admittedly not the only factor that may explain the success of
Proposition 11 (the state budget crisis obviously played a substantial
role), capitalizing on public participation in this fashion undoubtedly
shifted the terrain on which opponents of the measure had to try to

96. Supra notes 15–20, 31–36 and accompanying text.
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fight. Although this unelected commission is not electorally
accountable, it is a citizen panel, rather than an elite panel, intended
to be broadly representative of and responsive to California’s diverse
citizenry.
C. Another Model: The Joyce Foundation Campaign for Accountable
Redistricting
The prospects of bringing a redistricting reform effort to fruition
are dramatically enhanced when the accountability issue is defused
and the public is energized. Both goals can be accomplished through a
broadly participatory, citizen-based reform process. The Joyce
Foundation is now in the midst of a two-year campaign for
“Accountable Redistricting,” intended to advance a version of just
this approach by developing the “most democratic and participatory”
97
redistricting reform movement yet. Though this project also
encompasses media engagement and public education efforts
intended to pave the way for reform, at its core are citizen
redistricting commissions and an open source mapping project.
Partnering with Professor Gerken and several members of the
Election Law @ Moritz team at The Ohio State University (not
including the author of this essay), the campaign is developing the
citizen commission component of the project with several unique
features. One feature is to fully create in one or two states, before the
2011 redistricting cycle is underway, some version of a purely advisory
98
citizen commission to act as a model redistricting body. This body
would produce its own hypothetical legislative maps for public
comparison with the official maps to be created by the state’s existing
redistricting institution. Both the process by which this unofficial body
produces its maps, and the resulting maps themselves, could have a
substantial impact on the work of the official redistricting body in the
2011 cycle. Moreover, in the long term this “model commission”
experiment could offer an attractive alternative for states to adopt as

97. The Joyce Foundation, Campaign for Accountable Redistricting: A Strategic Blueprint
for Midwest States, at 2 (Nov. 2009).
98. In 2008, Ned Foley and Election Law @ Moritz, in partnership with the AEI-Brookings
Election Reform Project and Georgetown Law School’s Supreme Court Institute, undertook a
similar model project, to explore how to minimize partisan influences in a different aspect of the
American election system, namely the resolution of post-election disputes. The project involved
a special tribunal’s resolution of a simulated election contest. For more details, see McCain v.
Obama: A U.S. Supreme Court Hypothetical (One Hopes), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/electioncourt/index (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

6/2/2010 12:44:45 PM

MAKING REDISTRICTERS THE PEOPLE

65

their official redistricting process for the 2021 redistricting cycle.
Broad participation is key to the success of this approach. To that
end, another unique feature of the Joyce campaign is a “public
mediation” process for creating the citizen commission. Participants
are now at work in planning for the creation of a model commission
in Ohio and Illinois by identifying a diverse and extensive set of
stakeholders, and developing a consensus-based process for these
stakeholders collaboratively to design a citizen commission. Engaging
99
stakeholders and the public in this process serves to “inoculate” the
effort against the risk that it will be too detached from political
realities.
Furthermore, a collaborative citizen commission like that under
development through the Joyce campaign could build into it some
ongoing flexibility to revisit the criteria deemed important to an
“apolitical” redistricting process. For instance, if a preference for
competitive districts in one round of redistricting proves in fact to
100
leave too many voters disaffected, as some have cautioned it will,
the citizen commission could return to the conference table in
advance of the next decade’s round of redistricting to reflect upon
whether to adjust the set of mapmaking criteria. In some instances,
states might allow the commission to make only an advisory
recommendation that the legislature alter a set of statutory criteria.
Alternatively, some measure of discretion could be lodged in the
citizen commission to itself make such a change, perhaps with a
supermajority voting requirement, or simply to decide round-byround which criteria to favor or how to weight them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current partisan excesses in redistricting in the United States
may partially be the result of the historical blind spot about how
completely two parties would dominate American politics. Absent this
feature, redistricting by legislative bodies might not be so distorted.
Had this development been anticipated, an alternative redistricting
process might have been implemented from the outset, as has been
101
done in most other democracies around the globe. But the

99. Gerken, supra note 72, at 185.
100. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
101. See ACE Project, Structure and Rules for Delimiting Electoral Districts,
http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/bd/bdb (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
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unanticipated rise and entrenchment of the two-party system does not
need to leave citizens at the mercy of legislators who effectively
choose who their constituents will be.
Recent reform developments in both California and Ohio are but
a small part of the movement to separate control of the redistricting
process from self-interested legislators and political parties. But this
movement continually runs up against the problem of mobilizing
sufficient support among a public wary of turning over a core function
of our democracy to unaccountable elites. There is, nevertheless,
reason to hope that in coming decades both substantive and
procedural reforms can take root that will provide the redistricting
process with greater independence from partisan politics.
These reforms will almost certainly begin in states with a popular
initiative, where a broadly participatory, citizen-focused approach will
maximize their prospects for success. In one sense it is hard to say that
such a citizen effort would be “apolitical”—indeed, one of its
advantages is that it involves the public at large in core policy
questions. But this process would be distinctly different from the
partisan manipulation that so obviously affects most redistricting
today.
Thus, although redistricting may be an inherently political affair,
102
gerrymandering need not be a part of it. Rather, with increased
public involvement in a redistricting process that the people
themselves design and desire, we could replace the nonrepresentation-reinforcing gerrymander endemic today with a benign
act of line-drawing, intended to promote whatever “political” ends the
citizens have chosen, be it intra-district competition, overall political
fairness, or even blind redistricting. While this essay has not attempted
to design the details of a broadly participatory redistricting reform
process, in describing why such a process has the best chance of
success it seeks to encourage efforts to increase public involvement in
redistricting. Although it is still too early to assess the impact of
California’s Citizen Redistricting Commission, the Ohio Redistricting
Competition, or The Joyce Foundation’s Campaign for Accountable
Redistricting, these efforts are only three of many possible ways to

102. Here again, the term “gerrymandering” (a term potentially as ambiguous as
“apolitical”) is defined to mean manipulation of district lines for partisan or incumbentprotection ends, and not just any line drawing that deliberately advances the policy preferences
of those responsible.
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jointly increase voter salience about redistricting reform while
satisfying the popular demand for public accountability in
redistricting.

